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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 I. Introduction 
 
 Patricia A. Lyon sued her employer, Whisman & 
Associates, an accounting firm which is a Delaware corporation, 
and its president James A. Whisman, in the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware, charging that they failed to 
pay her overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards 
Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).  As a matter of convenience we 
will refer to both defendants as Whisman.  Lyon's complaint also 
included Delaware contract and tort claims charging that Whisman 
failed to pay her a promised bonus on time or in full.  At trial 
Lyon prevailed on all three grounds.  Whisman then appealed, 
challenging only the judgment on the tort claim.  We must vacate 
the judgments on both of the state law claims, however, because 
the claims did not share a "common nucleus of operative fact" 
with the FLSA claim, and thus the district court lacked subject 
  
matter jurisdiction over them supplemental to its federal 
question jurisdiction over the FLSA claim.1 
 We set forth the facts and the aspects of the 
procedural history necessary for resolution of the jurisdictional 
issue.2  Lyon began working as a bookkeeper for Whisman in 
January 1988 on an at-will basis for hourly wages.  Lyon and 
Whisman soon became embroiled in a dispute over a bonus that 
Whisman promised to pay Lyon at the end of 1988; by 1989 Lyon 
planned to find a new job.  Whisman, however, threatened to 
rescind the bonus if Lyon left its employment.  Although Whisman 
eventually did pay Lyon a bonus, she charges that the payment was 
late and was for less than the promised amount. 
 After Lyon left Whisman's employment she filed a three-
count complaint alleging that it had   
 (1) violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), 
by failing to pay overtime wages; 
 (2) violated Delaware contract law by paying 
a bonus smaller than promised; and 
 (3) violated Delaware tort law by 
threatening to withhold a vested bonus 
if she left its employ. 
                     
1
.  Since "the initial notice of appeal invokes [appellate] 
jurisdiction over the whole case," we properly may consider the 
propriety of the state contract judgment despite the fact that 
Whisman appealed only from the tort judgment.  United States v. 
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1167 (1992). 
2
.  Because of procedural concerns which we need not recount, 
Whisman filed a notice of appeal and amended notices of appeal in 
a successful effort to ensure that we would have appellate 
jurisdiction.  We have consolidated the appeals. 
  
The district court had federal question jurisdiction over Lyon's 
FLSA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Lyon asserted that it had 
"pendent" federal jurisdiction over the state law claims in 
counts two and three.  Neither the district court nor Whisman 
questioned this assertion of pendent jurisdiction which, in 
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367, we usually will call 
supplemental jurisdiction.  Since the district court did not have 
diversity jurisdiction, it could entertain the state-law claims 
only by exercising supplemental jurisdiction.  
 At trial Lyon won on all three counts.  She recovered 
$731.20 on the contract claim and $5,000 in compensatory damages 
and $20,000 in punitive damages on the tort claim.3  We cannot 
ascertain what she recovered on the FLSA claim as the docket 
sheets do not reflect the amount and the parties make no 
reference to it in their briefs.  Whisman appealed only from the 
judgment on count three, the Delaware law tort claim.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 II. Discussion 
 Although neither the parties nor the district court 
questioned the court's supplemental jurisdiction over Lyon's 
state law contract and tort claims, we inquire into that 
jurisdiction on our own initiative.  See Bender v. Williamsport 
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331 (1986).  
                     
3
.  The punitive damages verdict was for $75,000 but Lyon 
accepted a remittitur reducing the damages to $20,000.   
  
Consequently following oral argument we directed the parties to 
file briefs on this point and they have done so. 
 
 A. The Constitutional Test 
 Congress has authorized district courts to exercise 
jurisdiction supplemental to their federal question jurisdiction 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which states: 
 
 in any civil action of which the district 
courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental 
jurisdiction over all other claims that are 
so related to claims in the action within 
such original jurisdiction that they form 
part of the same case or controversy under 
Article III of the United States 
Constitution. 
 In Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d 
Cir. 1991), we treated section 1367 as codifying the 
jurisdictional standard established in United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966).  A leading treatise 
concurs:  "[Section 1367] incorporates the constitutional 
analysis of the Gibbs case."  13B Charles A. Wright et al., 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 3567.1 (supp. 1994), citing, inter 
alia, Soniform.4  Gibbs laid down three requirements for 
                     
4
.  Section 1367(c) may have modified the discretionary arm of 
the Gibbs decision, under which a district court may dismiss a 
supplemental claim notwithstanding that it has the constitutional 
power to entertain the claim.  See LaSorella v. Penrose St. 
Francis Healthcare Sys., 818 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Colo. 1993).  
Here, however, we are concerned with the district court's power 
to hear the state law claims under § 1367(a), and all authority 
indicates that Gibbs continues to control the constitutional 
dimension of this jurisdictional determination. 
 
  
supplemental jurisdiction.  First, "[t]he federal claim must have 
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the 
court."  Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138.  Lyon's FLSA 
claim satisfies this standard. 
 The other two requirements before federal courts may 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear state law claims are: 
 
 [1] The state and federal claims must derive 
from a common nucleus of operative facts.  
[2]  But if, considered without regard to 
their federal or state character, a 
plaintiff's claims are such that he would 
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one 
judicial proceeding, then, assuming 
substantiality of the federal issues, there 
is power in federal courts to hear the whole. 
Id.  Despite the ambiguity of the language connecting [1] the 
"nexus" requirement with [2] the "one proceeding" standard, all 
judicial authority finds that they are cumulative: state claims 
must satisfy both before a district court may exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction.  13B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 3567.1 (1984 & supp. 1994), citing 
Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 944, 92 S.Ct. 962 (1972); Beverly Hills Nat. 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania De Navegacione Almirante S.A., 437 
(..continued) 
 We do observe, however, that it is possible that even 
if the district court had the power to hear the supplemental 
claims, it abused its discretion in doing so.  Section 1367(c), 
inter alia, counsels against the exercise of jurisdiction when 
"the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law," and 
when "the [state] claim substantially predominates over the 
[federal] claims . . . ."  The tort claim in this suit is both 
novel and complex, and it seems to have predominated at the 
trial. 
  
F.2d 301, 306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 996, 91 S.Ct. 
2173 (1971).  Because we find that there was an insufficient 
factual nexus between the federal and state claims to establish a 
common nucleus of operative facts, we will not consider the "one 
proceeding" arm of Gibbs. 
 
 B. The Case-Specific Nature of the Inquiry 
 The test for a "common nucleus of operative facts" is 
not self-evident.  Indeed, "[i]n trying to set out standards for 
supplemental jurisdiction and to apply them consistently, we 
observe that, like unhappy families, no two cases of supplemental 
jurisdiction are exactly alike."  Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin 
Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 105 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
489 U.S. 1078, 109 S.Ct. 1528 (1989). 
 We can illustrate the fact-sensitive nature of 
supplemental jurisdiction determinations by contrasting our 
treatment of state defamation claims in Nanavati with our 
treatment of similar claims in PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306 (3d 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108, 95 S.Ct. 780 (1975).  In 
Nanavati, we found that the district court had the power to 
adjudicate a slander claim asserted by an antitrust defendant, 
noting that "a critical background fact (the enmity between the 
two physicians) is common to all claims."  Nanavati, 857 F.2d at 
105.  We concluded that the alleged slanders naturally would 
become part of the antitrust trial since the slander victim might 
use the slanderer's allegedly wrongful behavior to justify the 
victim's conduct which the other party contended was actionable 
  
under the antitrust laws.  Id. at 105-06.  In PAAC, however, we 
ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a state 
defamation claim in a suit brought under the Economic Opportunity 
Act charging the defendant with unlawfully interfering with the 
agency established under that law.  In PAAC we recited the 
operative language of Gibbs and found that the state claims were 
not related sufficiently to the federal claim to permit the 
exercise of pendent jurisdiction. 
 The line that separates Nanavati and PAAC is Article 
III of the Constitution.  Both cases fall near the line; one is 
on one side, the other is on the other side.  In most instances 
the question whether Article III is satisfied is not that close.  
For example, when the same acts violate parallel federal and 
state laws, the common nucleus of operative facts is obvious and 
federal courts routinely exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
the state law claims.  See, e.g., Pueblo Int'l, Inc. v. De 
Cardona, 725 F.2d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding jurisdiction 
over claims under Puerto Rico constitution, civil rights laws, 
and antitrust laws where federal jurisdiction was established 
under parallel laws, observing that "[t]he facts necessary to 
prove a violation of one are practically the same as those needed 
to prove a violation of the other"). 
 Thus, district courts will exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction if the federal and state claims "are merely 
alternative theories of recovery based on the same acts," Lentino 
v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1979).  
In Lentino, for instance, we recognized that there was federal 
  
jurisdiction over a state legal malpractice claim joined with an 
ERISA claim because the alleged malpractice involved precisely 
the same acts that the plaintiffs charged constituted a breach of 
fiduciary duties under ERISA.  In White v. County of Newberry, 
985 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1993), landowners sued the county for 
"response costs" under CERCLA and for inverse condemnation, 
claiming that the county's discharge of toxic waste into 
groundwater and wells effectively took their property.  In 
sustaining the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state law inverse condemnation claim, the court said that "[b]oth 
claims share the common element of showing that the County 
engaged in an act  a release [CERCLA language] or an 
affirmative, positive, aggressive act [South Carolina inverse 
condemnation language]  that in this case would be the dumping 
or disposal of [a toxin] in a manner that caused contamination     
. . . ."  Id. at 172.  Two areas in which the federal courts 
quite commonly exercise supplemental jurisdiction based on 
"alternative theories of recovery based on the same acts" are 
state fraud claims in securities cases5 and state assault claims 
in civil rights suits charging police abuses.6 
                     
5
.  See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); 
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 852, 91 S.Ct. (1970); First Interregional Equity Corp. v. 
Haughton, 805 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Storage 
Technology Corp. Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Colo. 1992); 
Bowman v. Hartig, 334 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
6
.  See Chudzik v. City of Wilmington, 809 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Del. 
1992); Stewart v. Roe, 776 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
  
 On the other hand, we have refused to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims totally unrelated to 
a cause of action under federal law.  For instance, in Local No. 
1 (ACA) v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 614 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 
1980), we found the district court powerless to try a state-law 
salary dispute when federal jurisdiction arose from a union 
merger dispute actionable under the Labor Management Relations 
Act ("LMRA").  We reasoned that "the merger and salary claims are 
factually distinct and do not meet the test enunciated in United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs . . . . [The two are] not derived 'from a 
common nucleus of operative facts.'"  Id. at 851-52. 
 As might be expected there are closer cases than those 
we have described.  Furthermore, the courts have not been 
consistent in defining the nexus between the federal and state 
claims necessary to support supplemental jurisdiction in these 
closer cases.  Thus, some courts have stated that even a "loose" 
nexus is enough.  Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 555 F. 
Supp. 730, 732 (D.S.C. 1983); Ritter v. Colorado Interstate Gas 
Co., 593 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D. Colo. 1984).  But at least one 
court strongly and explicitly has rejected this loose nexus test, 
finding that it expands judicial power beyond the limits set by 
Article III of the Constitution.  Mason v. Richmond Motor Co., 
625 F. Supp. 883, 886 (D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 825 F.2d 407 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (table).  Numerous other decisions implicitly reject 
the loose nexus test.7  Here we see no need to define how close 
                     
7
.  Sanders v. Duke Univ., 538 F. Supp. 1143, 1147-48 (M.D.N.C. 
1982); Klupt v. Blue Island Fire Dep't, 489 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 
  
the nexus between the federal and state claims must be to support 
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for, as we will 
demonstrate, under any standard the nexus between the federal and 
state claims in this case is inadequate for that purpose. 
 
 C. Implications of the Employer/Employee Nexus 
 Congress has the power to limit the jurisdiction of the 
inferior federal courts.  See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 
U.S. 323, 330, 58 S.Ct. 578, 582 (1938).  Thus, we do not doubt 
but that Congress could have provided expressly that district 
courts could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction in FLSA 
cases.  The statute, however, does not mention the scope of 
supplemental jurisdiction which a court should exercise.  Thus, 
we assume in this section that Congress wished a court in an FLSA 
action to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the limit 
permitted by Article III of the Constitution.8  Even under such 
an assumption, we find that there is an insufficient nexus 
(..continued) 
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Madery v. International Sound Technicians, 
Local 695, 79 F.R.D. 154, 156-57 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
8
.  Under one construction of section 1367, it is possible to 
argue that Congress mandated such an assumption.  By using the 
word "shall" in section 1367(a), the argument goes, Congress 
created a default rule that, absent specific language to the 
contrary, federal district courts should exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted under Article III 
(subject to the district court's discretion, delineated in 
section 1367(c)).  Gibbs contained no such presumption, so this 
argument would bring into question our assumption in Sinclair v. 
Soniform, supra, that section 1367 merely codified the 
constitutional arm of the Gibbs decision. 
  
between Lyon's federal FLSA claim and her Delaware claims to 
justify supplemental jurisdiction over the latter. 
 The only link between Lyon's FLSA and state law claims 
is the general employer-employee relationship between the 
parties.  In Prakash v. American Univ., 727 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), the court seemingly found such a relationship sufficient 
to confer supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.  In 
Prakash a terminated professor sued his former employer, 
asserting FLSA claims as well as state law claims for breach of 
contract, interference with contractual relations, conversion, 
deceit, and defamation.  In finding that the district court had 
jurisdiction over the state law claims, the court of appeals said 
that "[t]he federal and nonfederal claims [plaintiff] advances 
'derive from a common nucleus of operative facts'  [the 
plaintiff's] contract dispute with the university . . . ."  Id. 
at 1183. 
 Arguably Prakash is factually distinguishable from this 
case.  Fairly read, however, we believe that Prakash stands for 
the proposition that FLSA plaintiffs can try all state law 
contract claims against their employers in a federal proceeding, 
as the employment relationship alone provides a factual nexus 
sufficient to confer supplemental jurisdiction. 
 Yet there is virtually no support for this broad 
reading of the reach of Article III and of Gibbs.9  In Hales v. 
                     
9
.  We note that even under the opinion of the Prakash court it 
might be found that the district court lacked jurisdiction over 
Lyon's state tort claim, inasmuch as the Prakash court predicated 
its finding that there was federal jurisdiction on the nexus 
  
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 500 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1974), the court 
ruled that it could not entertain a state-law claim for failure 
to make payments from a profit-sharing plan despite the factual 
link to a federal claim under the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (repealed), charging that 
a plan administrator failed to provide statutorily required 
information.  The factual nexus in Winn-Dixie, where both claims 
revolved around a specific area of employer-employee relations, 
presents stronger grounds for jurisdiction than cases based 
solely on the general employment relationship.  Nonetheless, the 
court found that:  
 [t]he record establishes beyond doubt that 
the [two counts] do not grow out of a 'common 
nucleus of operative facts' [citing Gibbs] 
. . . .  While plaintiffs may have sought 
[the federally mandated] information in order 
to consider and/or assert their [state law] 
claims, their causes of action under both 
Counts I and II are separately maintainable 
and determinable without any reference to the 
facts alleged or contentions stated in or 
with regard to the other count.  Id. at 847-
48. 
 District courts have resisted expanding supplemental 
jurisdiction based merely on an employment contract in a variety 
of federal statutory settings.  Thus, in both Nicol v. 
Imagematrix, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1991), and Benton 
(..continued) 
between the federal and state claims created by the employment 
relationship.  Nevertheless, because we find the Prakash decision 
unconvincing, we do not analyze the difference between 
supplemental jurisdiction based on the nature of the claim, be it 
tort or contract.  In both cases, we question the existence of a 
sufficient factual nexus to confer jurisdiction. 
  
v. Kroger Co., 635 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Tex. 1986), the courts 
refused to permit plaintiffs to use Title VII discrimination 
suits, combined with their status as employees, to bootstrap 
state claims into federal court.  In declining to entertain state 
contract and fraud claims in a sexual discrimination suit, Nicol 
pointedly noted that the sole common fact between the state and 
federal claims was the employment relationship.  Nicol, 767 F. 
Supp. at 747.  In Benton, the plaintiff contended that her 
employer fired her either as an act of sexual discrimination or 
in retaliation for her having filed a worker's compensation 
claim.  The court refused to consider the state law retaliation 
claim, finding that "[a]lleged incidents of sexual harassment or 
gender bias were entirely separate from the circumstances 
surrounding plaintiff's back injury.  These separate events can 
hardly be grouped as the 'common nucleus of operative facts . 
. . .'"  Benton, 635 F. Supp. at 59. 
 District courts similarly have found that they did not 
have supplemental jurisdiction to entertain a variety of state 
claims in age discrimination cases.  In Mason v. Richmond Motor 
Co. the court concluded it could not exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a state law breach of contract claim (based on 
an oral promise that the defendant would never fire the 
plaintiff) in an ADEA wrongful discharge suit.  The court, 
applying Gibbs, found that "[o]nly one fact is common to both the 
federal and state claims; and that is that plaintiff was fired by 
his employer."  625 F. Supp. at 888.  In Robinson v. Sizes 
Unlimited, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 442 (D.N.J. 1988), another ADEA 
  
case, the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over state 
age discrimination claims, but concluded that it could not 
entertain a state claim predicated on discrimination against a 
plaintiff because of a handicap. 
 We find these precedents compelling.  Lyon's FLSA claim 
involved very narrow, well-defined factual issues about hours 
worked during particular weeks.  The facts relevant to her state 
law contract and tort claims, which involved Whisman's alleged 
underpayment of a bonus and its refusal to pay the bonus if Lyon 
started looking for another job, were quite distinct.  In these 
circumstances it is clear that there is so little overlap between 
the evidence relevant to the FLSA and state claims, that there is 
no "common nucleus of operative fact" justifying supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims.  In fact, it would be 
charitable to characterize the relationship of the federal and 
state claims as involving even a "loose" nexus.  Thus, Article 
III bars federal jurisdiction. 
 
 D. Congressional Intent Under the FLSA 
 We have assumed up to this point that Congress intended 
district courts in FLSA actions to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction subject only to the limits of Article III; even so, 
we have concluded that the district court did not have the power 
to hear Lyon's contract and tort claims.  In addition, we 
question whether Congress intended courts in FLSA actions have 
such broad jurisdiction.  In its "declaration of policy" for the 
FLSA, Congress found that existence of "labor conditions 
  
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers" caused harm to interstate commerce.  29 U.S.C. § 202.  
Accordingly, its "declared policy" under the FLSA was "to correct 
and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate [these] conditions."  
Id. 
 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he central aim of 
the [FLSA] was to achieve . . . certain minimum labor standards."  
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292, 80 
S.Ct. 332, 335 (1960).  The substantive sections of the FLSA, 
narrowly focusing on minimum wage rates and maximum working 
hours, bear out its limited purposes.  Accordingly, we find no 
indication that Congress passed the FLSA with the expectation 
that it was authorizing federal courts to exercise far-reaching 
jurisdiction over state-law disputes arising from employment 
relationships.  This restrained view of the scope of federal 
jurisdiction is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement 
that "[i]n the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress did not intend 
that the regulation of hours and wages should extend to the 
furthest reaches of federal authority."  McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 
U.S. 491, 493, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 1249 (1943).    
 We do not mean to imply that a district court never may 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims in an FLSA 
action.  For example, an employee seeking to enforce an 
employment contract granting hourly wages in excess of the 
(statutorily required) time and a half probably could assert her 
state law contract claim on a supplemental jurisdictional basis 
  
along with her FLSA claim in a district court, since the 
"operative facts" in the two claims would be identical.  But 
still, when a court exercises federal jurisdiction pursuant to a 
rather narrow and specialized federal statute it should be 
circumspect when determining the scope of its supplemental 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, Congressional intent may provide a 
second, non-constitutional ground for finding that the district 
court did not have jurisdiction over Lyon's state law claims.10 
 
 III. Conclusion 
 Because we find that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over Lyon's state law contract and tort 
claims, we will vacate its judgments on those two counts and 
remand the matter with instructions to dismiss those claims 
without prejudice.  Of course, the district court did have 
jurisdiction over Lyon's FLSA claim, and our decision does not 
disturb the judgment on that count.  The parties will bear their 
own costs on this appeal. 
 
 
 
                     
10
.  While our result may seem harsh as this case was tried 
without jurisdictional objection in the district court, we point 
out that in all likelihood Lyon will be able to file her state 
law claims in the Delaware state courts without being barred by 
the statute of limitations.  See Frombach v. Gilbert Assocs., 
Inc., 236 A.2d 363 (Del. 1967); Houmet Corp. v. City of 
Wilmington, 285 A.2d 423 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).  However, our 
conclusion is not dependent on that belief. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
